The Sequencing Problem
Who hears first, and what do they hear?
Every disclosure node below has a regulatory floor (the latest you can wait) and a strategic ceiling (the earliest you should move). The gap between the two is where the company gets to choose its posture. The choice is not whether to disclose. The choice is the order and the level of detail.
1 · DoD CIO and Cognizant Program Office
Window: 0–72 hours
The regulatory anchor. DFARS 252.204-7012 governs the timing. The program office governs the substance. The cognizant security authority will want the full reasoning trace, the marking-by-marking inventory, and a remediation plan in the room. They will not want a sanitized version. They will know if you brought one.
What they need: the trace, the inventory, the remediation plan. What you control: the framing of the agent's role.
Second-order consequence
2 · Helion Board and Executive Committee
Window: 24–48 hours
The board needs to hear it from the CISO and the general counsel together, not separately. Disclosure to the board triggers fiduciary obligations downstream and conditions the company's posture for every subsequent audience. The board will ask one question first: did we have warning. The minutes from the May agentic-AI review meeting answer that question. The answer is yes.
What they need: incident summary, exposure estimate, remediation timeline. What you control: the May minutes context.
Second-order consequence
3 · Affected Vendor (Kaitlyn Mercado's Firm)
Window: 24–96 hours
The vendor is both the proximate discoverer and the proximate liability counterparty. Formal notification triggers the vendor's own DFARS clock, the vendor's tenant quarantine obligations, and the vendor's own counterintelligence reporting. The notification has to come from Helion's general counsel to the vendor's general counsel, in writing, with the offer of paid independent forensic review attached.
What they need: formal notice, quarantine request, forensic-review offer. What you control: the tone of the cover letter.
Second-order consequence
4 · FBI and Counterintelligence Channels
Window: 48–168 hours
The H-1B engineers, the foreign-influence flagging, and the residual question of whether the data was exfiltrated all push toward FBI engagement through the Bureau's existing DIB liaison. Engaging early gets the company credit for proactive cooperation. Engaging late means the FBI learns about it through the vendor or through the program office, and the conversation starts on a worse footing.
What they need: audit logs, personnel reporting, agent reasoning trace. What you control: whether you initiate or get called.
Second-order consequence
5 · The Press and the Defense Industrial Base
Window: 72–336 hours
Voluntary public disclosure carries reputational risk and sector-wide benefit. Mandatory public disclosure (if the SEC determines the incident is material) carries timing the company does not control. The middle path is coordinated release through the CISA-led DIB information-sharing channel within seven to fourteen days, with a follow-on public summary. The press will write the story regardless. The question is whether Helion sources it.
What they need: a clean narrative they can verify. What you control: who they get it from.
Second-order consequence